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ABSTRACT
This research shows that it is possible for cattle feeders to obtain additional profits if a
consistent technical strategy for trading is applied to the catde crush spread. However, when
trading costs are introduced, the likelihood of obtainingprofit from trading the crush reduces
considerably. It also shows that the level of gains from the cattle crush is related to the month
the cattle are marketed. Wlien the crush is used as a hedgingstrategyit decreases the profit from
the feeding operation and reduces the volatility of those returns,helping producers to transfer
part of the price risk associated with their production.
To provide evidence of these findings, this study utilizes daily prices for 1995 to 2006 of the
fixtures contracts of corn, feeder and live catde to construct the daily catde crush spread for two
different combination of futures contracts. These contract combinations suppose that cattle are
fed in feedlots for 170 days before being marketed in April and in October. Two different
scenarios are also evaluated using the cattle crush spread: one in which the crush is employed as
a pre-placement hedging tool and another in which the crush is usedas a post-placement
hedging method.
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Feeding cattle in Iowa is an enterprise that implies dealingwith risk. This risk comes from
different sources: a) once the feeding process starts, there is a minimum holding period within
which the cattle can not be sold (investment is fixed), b) there is uncertainty about the selling
price of the fed animal, and c) there is variability of the price of the production inputs (i.e. feed).
Besides die risk that comes from price volatilit)', diere is the uncertainty of obtaining positive
returns on the feedlot operation. According to the Estimated Livestock Return for Iowa
calculate by Iowa State University' (Figure 1.1), the return on finishing yearling steers (i.e. feeding
animals from 750 lb to 1,250 lb to Choice slaughter grade) was unprofitable 40%of the time
during the period 1991 to 2006.Monthly average return in terms of fed catde sold ranged from a
loss of $11.15/cwt to a profit of $35.23/cwtand the average return was $1.95/cwt.
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Figure1.1. Estimated returns for finishing mediumNo. 1yearling steers to Choice
slaughter grade, Iowa-Minnesota (1991-2006)
Iowa cattle production is an important economic enterprise. According to the Iowa's Beef
Center (2006), cattle sales represent about 20% of Iowa's annual agricultural income and the
total economic impact of the cattle sector from inputs to processing is estimated at $5.32 billion
annually. By January 2006, Iowa had the seventh largest cattle inventory in the US with 3,8
million of head (around 3.9% of tlie total), while it had the fifth state largest amountof catde on
feedwith 920,000 headwhich is equivalent to 6.5% of the nation's cattle total (USDA-NASS).
Return (andits variability) from the feeding process depends on multiples aspects. However, the
cattle pricemargin (thedifference between fed cattle and feeder cattle price) hasa greater effect
on the variability of return from feeding, as it is shown inFigure 1.2.' Indeed, Swanson andWest
(1963) using coefficients of separate determination found that the catde pricemargin explained
38% of profit variation, while Langemeier et al. (1992) and Schroeder et al. (1993), using the
same method found that fed cattle and feeder catde prices explained approximately 50% and
25% of return variation respectively. In addition, Albright et al, (1993) found that together, fed
and feeder steerprices explain 71% to 80% of profit risk.^
' Correlation between these two variables was large (e=0.94) for the period from january of 1991 toMarch of 1996.
- Figures .>\.I to .\.3 in the appendix show thevolatilir)- of the lov^-a cash markets for com, feeder cattle and fed
catde.
49.0
Cattlo once margin Profit per head
-91 ANlay-92 Sep-93 \pr-03 Sep-04 Jan-06
Figure 1.2. Cattle price margin and return to feeding (1991-2006)
Knowing that, cattle producers should focus on maximizing the cattle price margin and buying
com at the lowest possible pricc. To that end feedlot operators can employ futures markets to
manage a future delivery price of livecatde (also called fed cattle) that maximizes the catde price
margin and at the same time reduces the risk involved in the feeding process. In theory, through
the use of futures contracts,producers are able to chooseat what futures prices for feedercatde
and com theywouldbewilling to buy andatwhat futures prices for fed catde they would be
willing to sellin order to reach a certain level of profit.
Despite the fact that live catde futures contracts have been traded ia the US since 1964 and
feeder cattle futures contracts started in 1971, it seems that there isa small percentage of catde
on feed that is hedged by producers. Some factors can belisted to explain this: a) as itwas
pointed outby Riley (1971), some producers have engaged inhedging with unsatisfactory results
(i.e. they did not reach the level ofprofits tliey were expecting) and as aconsequence, stopped
using future markcts\ b) there is not enough public research on technical and fijndamental
analysis and strategics that might increase the likeliliood of better hedging the cattlc production
and therefore attaining higher returns"', and c) not hedging could bemore profitable than
hedging.
Numerous empirical smdies have investigated the profitability of technical trading rules in
a wide variet)* of markets andmany of themfound positive effects. These techniques arebased
on the idea of tlie existence of temporal violations of the weak form of efficientmarkets theory
described by Fama in 1965. The weak form asserts that aU past marketprices and data are fully
reflected in commodities prices and therefore, technical analysis should not work on defininga
trading strateg}'. The most common technical tools are based on trend analysis (e.g. trend lines,
moving averages, and price channels), oscillators and momentums (e.g. the relative strength
index), figures formation (e.g. head and shoulders formation, triangles, double tops and bottoms
formations and reversal formations) and point and figure charting. More sophisticated analyses
include wave theory (e.g. Fibonacci and the Elliot'sWaveTheory) although these are more
difficult to interpret as pointed out byWinters (2005).
The risk and lowmargin from feeding catdehave had an impact on the current organization of
the feedyard operations. On die one hand, the number of catde marketed has sharply dropped in
the past 20 years (Figure 1.3). On the other hand, fcedlots in Iowa have decreased in number but
increased in size. As described by Clement (2001), small feedlot operations are fading away while
' Ina reccnt sim ey for Iowa, Lawrence and Schuknecht (2005) found that 50% of the respondents considered die
"ability tomanage price risk with futures/opdons" as an issue that had a positive impact inmaking a profit in the
cattle business.
Most of the strategics on futures markets are developed by financial compajiies and are used for speculanon
purposes given the fact that financial companies rarely can alter production decisions.
midsize farms arc expanding to increase profitability by lowering costs through economies of
scale andby selling a higher volume of cattle. TheUSDA-NASS reported that in 1984 Iowa had
20,000 feedlots, of which 760 had more than 1,000 head capacity and marketed nearly one
million head (around53%of the total). In 2005, the governmental agency estimated that there
were approximately 8,940 feedlots of which 340hadmore than 1,000 head capacity and
marketed 780,000 head of cattle (nearly 50% of the total).
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Figure 1.3. Iowa cattle and calves marketed (1984-2005)
The increase in si2e of the feedyards demands more refined strategies to hedge price uncertainty.
The larger the operation, the more likely that sharp fluctuations ofinput and output prices will
dnve some feedlot producers out of business if they are notwell prepared to assume sucha risk.
Sandmo (1971) showed tliat under price uncertaint)^ the output of larger feedlots tends to be
smaller. In addition, the ever present threat ofunexpected losses affects the ability of feeders to
operate at or near optimal physical efficiency (Spahr andSawaya (1981)). MacDonald andKorb
and MacDonald (2006) observed that by reducing price risks, production and marketing
contracts can make it easier for farmers to obtain credit and thus expand operations.
Most of the hedging strategies involve die use of futures markets. Producers that sell live catde
can hedge their production to lock in a certain price (and profit) tliat is a function of their utilit}'
function. This utility function depends on the priceof corn, feeder catde, live catde, the interest
rate, and the technology available at the farm, as well as the fixed cost of the operation. Several
studies have addressed the question of what is the theoretical optimal hedged ratio that a feedlot
operator should use to hedge the cattle production. In most of those studies, the optimal hedge
strategy is based on the expected-utility maximization paradigm and the minimum variance
criteria. Other research, in particular the study done by Lien and Tse (2000), focused on
improving the estimation of the optimal hedge ratio using nonlinearityin spot and futures
returns.
The catde crush is a mechanism of hedging risk through futures markets that allows catde
feedets to reduce price risk. The catde crush is fonned when at least two live futures contracts
are sold and one futures contract of feeder catdeand one of corn are bought to better match
contractsizes. This crush can be used either as a pre-placement or as a post-placement hedging
tool; therefore, it is closely related to the lengdi of time catde remain in feedlots.
The trading opportumties of the crush were assessed through the use of some technical analysis
techniques such as moving averages, oscillators and momenmms. The hypothesis that was tested
is that the cattle crush market may not be efficient; therefore, a systematic application ofsome
technical rules may increase the likelihood of producers' reaching a certain level of return, or
increasing the actual level of profit due to the composition of the cattle crush and the underlying
interactions of its components.
Futures contracts data were obtained from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the
Chicago Board ofTrade (CBOT), barchart.com, andBloomberg. Cashprices for live catde,
feeder catde, and corn came from the Livestock Marketing Information Center (LMIC) that
compiles information reported by the USDA-AMS for differentregional markets (i.e. Iowaand
Missouri). Finally, data for Iowa feedlots was obtained from the Iowa Tri-County Steer Carcass
Futurity Program Cooperative fTCSCF) f^or the 2001-2005 period and from the Iowa State
University livestock Enterprise Budget.
Research objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to applymultiple tradingmethods based on technicalanalysis
to find out if there is an improvement in net returns for cattle feeders. Instead of utilizing these
technical strategies on the cash market of each of the component of the catde production (i.e.,
corn, feeder cattle and livecattle), a catde crush spread using futures markets was derived and
utilized. Tliis spread assumes that cattie are marketed in April and October after animals were
fed for a 170-day period. Bothconditions gowell with the average behavior of the cattie
production in Iowa. In addition, this study makes use of statistical metiiods to construct a
systematic way of evaluating choices that producers can employ to trade the cattie crush spread.
^The rCSCF is governed by ngroup ofbeef producers and agribusiness people from SW Iowa and has developed
Extension and producer contacts inGeorgia, South Carolina, Indiana, /Vlabama, Virginia, Florida, Tennessee,
Mississippi and Missouri that assist with recruiting producers and cattle to be fed in SW Iowa. The program started
in 1983 widi 35 consignors and 106 steers. In 2005, over 600 consignors evahiated 8,713 head of steers and heifers.
Nine custom feedlots wereutilized in the program.
Strategies were divided into pre-placement and post-placcmcnt hedging tactics with the goal to
generate ahernarive scenarios. Another important objective of this thesis is to determine if there
is any difference inbenefits for producers that hedge futures sales of fed catde inOctober orin
April.
Thesis organization
llie first chapter of tliis thesis is the general introduction. Tlie following chapter is a review of
literature on the cattle feeding system and the exploration of the theoryof hedging risk through
fiitures markets. It also describes the technical analysis methods that are used to develop the
trading mles. The objective of the diird chapter is to crcafe and evaluate the method of deriving
the catde crush spread and to analyze the resulting time scries. Chapter 4 contains the principal
findings of using the catde crush spread as a pre-placementand post-placement hedging tool. It
also includes description of the actual rules applied to trade the cattle crush spread. The fmal
chapter contains the conclusions and recommendadons for futures researches on this topic.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Feedlot operation
A fccdlot is an animal feeding operation (AFO) inwliich capacit)' varies from less than 100 head
to more that 50,000head. The basic idea of a feedlot is to provide high-energy feed that
promotes low feed-to-meat conversion, high daily weight gain and to encourage the deposit of
lean gain andmarbling in the animal's muscles prior to slaughter. Generally, cattle in feedlots
receive a diet consisting of grain (i.e., com and corn co-products), protein supplements (i.e.,
soybean meal or cottonseed) and roughage (i.e., hay, silage or alfalfa) until the catde reaches an
appropriate weight to be brought to market. According to Lawrenceet al. (2001), catde feeding
adds value to com and forage, more fully employs farm resources such as labor, facilities, and
machinery, and provides profit opportunides for skillful managers.
A "typical" feedlot operationbeginswith steers that are 6 to 18months old and that weight 500
to 900 lb. These animals are fed for 110 to 250days until they reach a weight that ranges from
900 to 1,400 lb at slaughter (Figure 2.1). Data fromJanuar)' of 2006 shows that Iowa has 920,000
head of catde on feed, 495,000 of which were in feedlots with 1,000 or more head capacity and
the rest remained in smaller feedyards.
Animal
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Figure 2.1. Description of the cattle production
Feeder cattle are die "inidal investment" made in feedlot opcradons in order to produce fed
catde. These feeder steers that are placed in feedlots can be: a) bought in the spot market (e.g.
feeder cattle auctions, direct from the ranch or through intermediaries), b) raised from a
cow/calf operation linked to the feeder process, and c) placed by livecattle producers to be
custom fed while retaining ownership.
Com is the main feed used in the production of catde. In Iowa com accounts for about 73% of
the feeding costwhilecom silage accounts for about 19%. Iowa has the advantage of the
availability of corn and corn by-products. According to Lawrence et al. (2001), during the 1990s,
north central Iowa com prices averaged from as little as $0.10/bu under southwest Nebraska
prices, to asmuchas$0.35/bu less than in parts of theTexas catde feeding region. This
represents an advantage for lowan cattle producers because margins can reach higher levels
when there is cheap feedand strong product demand. For this reason,it is reasonable that some
cattle feeders grow their own corn with the objective tobenefit from the comparative advantage
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and from the reduction on price uncertainty thatcomes with storing the grain. However, this
situation seems to be changing and currently most Iowa crop farmers donotown livestock and
most livestock producers do not grow crops. According toBabcock (2005), this is a result of
many factors, tliemost importantones are: a) the size ofminimum-cost livestock production
operations have increased and relatively small cattie feeding operations that characterized Com
Beltagriculture havebeen largely replaced by huge operations in l-Cansas, Oklahoma, andTexas,
and b) many crop farmers are happy to let the livestock go because new equipment and crop
production methods have increased the per-bushel cost advantage of larger operations.
Additionally, larger operations are easier to manage without the worr)' of livestock. Expanded
crop insurance options and generous commodit)' programs greatly reduced the risk for farmers
who switched to crop specialization while removed most of the advantages that diversified
farmers enjoyed in the past.
Length of time in the feedlot
There is a largevariety of feeding plans since feeding processes varygready depending upon the
animal weightgain,marketing price, final grade desired for the catde,weightand age of the
catde, and sizeof feedlot and feed availability. ITie effects of some of these variables on the
number of days on feed are as foUows: a) daily gain. Animal genetics predetermine the limits of
the catde daily weight gain therefore animals sold have different feeding requirements andhave
different weight at slaughter, b) marketing price. If a feedlot operator expects high future prices
on Uve catde he or she may feed heavier steers in order to capture those higher market prices.
On the contrary, a producer can sell lighter steers if the actual live catde prices are more
attractive than the expected futures prices. As Jarrige and Beranger (1992) pointed out, higher
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weight gain and feed prices cause fccdlt>t operators to look at heavier feeder cattle which wiU
permit a shorter grain-feeding phase, and c) Cattle grading. According to the Arkansas Steer
Feedout Program (2003), a factor that affected the relationship between days on feed and feedlot
net return was the price difference between Choice and Sclcct quality grades. Three main factors
that affect marbling are: a) the genetic ability tomarble and the ability of die breed tograde
Choice, b) the maturity or the physiological age, not the chronological age, and c) ration of feed
pro\aded.
Profit function for the feeding cattlc process
With the knowledge of the inputs and outputs of the feeding cattle enteiprise, a profit function
for a 6-month feeding period can be stated as follows:
TVi^CfHve. f+6) = pUve. r+6XCJth-e, / +6—(pcom. lX(Jcorn. I+ pfceder, iX(^feeder, /)+/" + £/ +6
Where ti is the profit of sellingq pounds of live catdc at pricep in /+<? months from month /,
minus the sum of the most significant costs incurred at montii t. com and feeder catde.Other
costs are described by/(fixed, labor, transportation, etc.). Lastly, the random effects of the price
output are condensed in the variable e which is assumed to follow a normal distribution with
mean and variance of zero and
Market information and efficiency in the cattle market
Fama (1965) defined an efficient marketas one where there is a large number of rational, profit-
maximizers agents that actively compete with each other and try to predict future market values
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of individual securities in markets where important currcnt information is almost freely available
toall participants. In an efficient market, competition among the many informed participants
leads to a situation where at any point in time the actual prices of an individual commodity
already reflects the effects of information based onevents that have already taken place and on
eventswhich,as of that moment, the market expects to occur in the future. Similarly, Lucas
(1972) noticed that the way inwhich expectations are formed changes when the behavior of the
forecasted variable changes. Both theories suggest that when themarket figures out that a
commodity price follows a certain pattern, no abnormal profits canbe made byusing this
information.
Fedcattle that are sold today were feeder cattle in the past. This characteristic of the beefmarket
should allowcattle feeders to better forecast the future price on the cattle that they market.
However, when it comes to cattle selling prices this "pipeline" approach may work for
estimating the amount of catde that will be sold in the future but not for forecasting prices. In
theor)*, there are some of leading indicators that should helppredict the future beha\aorof live
cattle prices, some of tliem are:
• Cattle on feed and live cattle futures prices. Cattle on feed have a well defined cyclical
and periodic pattern (Figure 2.2). Cattle placed on feed today become the cattle slaughtered
in the future. In theory, high placementsof cattle should lead to lower prices of live cattle
futures contracts (ceteris paribus). Yet Figure 2.2 shows that the live future prices (lagged 6
months)were negatively correlated to the amount of cattle placedon feed only in some
14
petiods^ Then, the relationship ofcattle on feed and live cattle prices in the futures is not
clearly defined.
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Figure 2.2. Monthly US placement of cattle (1,000+ capacity feedlots) and futures prices
• Price of corn today affects future price of fed cattle. Cattle prices should reflect the
increase (decrease) in the price of feed. In theory, periods of high corn price should push the
price of future fed cattle up. However, Figure 2.3 shows that the relationshipworks only
when corn price skyrocketed in 2004 and that in general there were more periods when that
correlation was very low or negative.Then, catde feeder can not take advantage of this
indicator to determine when to start a feeding process.
^In the graph feedlots witli 1,000+ capacit)' were compared to live cattle futures prices. Notice that the feedlots
with 1,000+ capacit)' account for 85%of die total fed-cattle market, then catde that are fed in sniaU feedlots with
less than 1,000 headwerenot included in this calculation (CME (1995)).
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Figure 2.3. Corn prices and live cattle futures contract prices
Com and feeder cattle prices. These f\vo producdon inputs were negatively correlated
(e=-0.29 for the period 1998 to 2006). As Dhup'ctter et al. (2001) pointed out, buyers pay a
higher price per pound for lightweight feeder cattle relative to heavier feeder cattle because
the cost of adding weight (i.e., cost of gain) isgenerally less than the value of additional
weight. Therefore, high cornprices leads to a lower price paid for feeder cattle (Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2,4. Com prices and live cattle futures contract prices
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Having analyzed diese two important relationships, it becomes apparent thata number of odier
factors (i.e. changes in domestic and foreign supply and demand, price variation of beef's
substitutes, days that animals remain on feed, etc.) have significant impact on the evolution of
live cattie prices and, in addition, they can not be easily followed and predictedby producers.
That is to say that with the use of this information it would not be possible to create trading
rules that can help producers to obtain abnormal profits frommarketing cattle. In consequendy,
two conclusion can be drawn: a) even if theywant to, producers are not wellinformed about all
the variables that affect the future price of live cattie,which implies that their decision-making
varies (and some producers can act irrationally), and b) producers may fail to gather and analyze
all the fundamental information that affects the cattle market, therefore a technical tool should
be use to complement tiie study of the cattie market
Risk management in the cattlc production
Theoreticallyspeaking, the motivation for riskmanagement in cattle production comes from the
fact that future prices of production inputs and outputs havea random component that follows
an unknown patii. That is to say, producers are not certain about the parameters that influence
the costs and the returns in the cash flowprocess. For example, the effect of weather on the
com yields and prices can add uncertainty^ to the future priceof fed catde.A drought can
decrease the corn supply and consequendy lead to an increase in com prices that can affect the
priceof feed used to feed steers. At the end of the day, live cattie producers will have higher
production costsand may try to seek higher selling prices for the cattie they fed as a
compensation for higher input prices.
17
Oneway to manage risk of fluctuating cash prices iswith futures markets. Hull (2005) defined a
future contractas an agreement between twoparties to buyor sell an asset for a certain price at a
certain time in the future. Futures markets make it possible for producers and consumers to plan
ahead by locking in the price they will pay or receive in the future and enabling them to reduce
the risk of price fluctuation. A commodit)- producer (say, a live catde producer) would agree to
sellhis cattle at a certain price (1<) at a stated time in the future, and the user of the commodit}^
(say, a meat packer) would consent to buy them.
By agreeingon a price, quantity, and delivery date, producers reduce uncertainty into their
operations and reduce risk. In this case the cattle producer has assumed a short hedge (or sell)
on live catde ftitures contracts because he or she already owns the cattle and expects to market it
in the future and wants to lock in a certain price at some time in the future. A short futures
position generates a loss if the live cattle increases in price and a gain if it decreases in price (see
panel (a). Figure 2.4). Conversely, catde producers can assume a long hedge (or buy) on com and
feedercatde futures contracts to protect themselves from the uncertain input prices the next
time they feed catde. If the price of corn increases abruptly (as it did in 1996 and 2004) above
that price defined by the futures contract, the hedge pays off because the live catde producer
saves moneybypajing the lowerprice. However, if the price of corn goes down, livecatde
producer is still obligated to paydie price specified in the contract and in this case looses (see
panel (b). Figure 2.4),
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Figure 2.5. Payoffs from futures contracts
Despite the large amount of research on tlie effects that hedging inputs and outputs has on risk
and on the production margin, there seems to benoconsensus on this issue. Bullock and Logan
(1970), Shafer et al. (1978) and Spahr and Sawaya (1981) showed thatsome selected hedging
strategies on the catde market can lead to lower variabilit)' on die profit variance and, insome
cases, and improvement in the dollar return on head produced. In contrast, Tooman (2001) and
Brorsen and Fofana (2001), suggested that in the event that cash market movements do not
mirror movements in the futures markets perfecdy over the life of a hedge, large and unforeseen
losses may result. In addition,costs related to the capital required to maintain futures margins
accounts that are non-tri\aal can be associatedwidi losses from using the futures markets.
Both size and delivery date of the fiimres contracts are standardizedwhich ensure liquidity in the
market. The frequency of the deliver)' of the future contracts is high, which guarantees the
liquidity of the contracts on the market. Table 2.1 depicts specifications of futures contract for
corn, feeder catde, and live catde in the Chicago markets.
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Contract
Characteristics
Corn futures
(CBOT)
Feeder Cattle
(CME)
live Catde
(CME)
Contract size 5,000 bushels 50,000 pounds 40,000 pounds
Months traded Dec, Mar, May,
Jul, Sep
Jan, Mar, Apr, May,Aug,
Sep, Oct and Nov
Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug, Oct,
Dec (seven months in
the even monthly cycle).
Jan, Mar,May, Jul, Sep,
Nov (three months in
the odd monthly cycle).
Price quoted Cents/bushel Cents/pound Cents/pound
Delivery day Second
business day
following the
last trading day
of the delivery
month
All contracts open as of the
termination of trading shall
be cash settled based upon
the CME Feeder Cattle
Index™ for the seven days
ending on the Thursday on
which trading tenuinates '
Delivery may be made
on any business day of
the contract month, and
on the first seven
business days in the
succeeding calendar
month
T)'pe of delivery Commodity Expire to a cash index price Commodity
Last trading day is the business day prior to the 15th calendar day of the contract month.
The CJVIE feeder cattle contract covers catde tliat enter the feedlots in the 650-849 pound range for finishing to
market weight.
Trading terminates on the last Tliursday of the contract month.
Basis risk
The price difference between the futures and the cash markets is called the basis and should be
less than the delivery cost of the underlying commodity. The futures price represents the
national price, while cash prices in each localarea varyby the specific demand and supply
conditions. Basis risk refers to the possibility that this differencewill change during the life of a
contract resulting in an unexpected lossor gain (Baggett andWard (2002)). The basis in a
hedging situation is defined as follows:
Basis —Cashprice ofthe asset to be hedged— Futureprice ofthe contract used
20
According to Errera and Brown (1999), there are two principles of futures prices that affect
basis: a) parallelism: changes in the cash andin the futures market prices have a tendency to
correlate highly with one another andshould remain stable, andb) convergence: cash and
futures prices are the same (converge) at the expiration of the futures contract, thus basis must
be zero at expiration at the delivery point of the futures contract (except for delivery cost).
Basic risk can change due to variations in domestic and foreign supply and demand that affect
prices in the cashmarket,amount of commodities in storage that is carryover, storage and
transportation costs. According to Chance (2002), hedging in the non-contractmonths can also
createbasis risk. For example, a cattie feeder unable to match the actualdate in whicli the cattle
are place in feedlots with the month of deliver)' of com or feeder catde generates basis risk.
Figures 2.5 to 2.7 displays the paths of the basis between Iowa cash corn, feeder catde and fed
cattie and their respective futures contract prices.
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Figure 2.6. Basis between Central Iowa com and nearby com futures price (1993-2006)
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Figure 2.8. Basis between Iowa fed steers and nearby LC futures price (2001-2006)
Corn basis data (1993-2006) shows that Iowa corn priced on the cash market runs $0.28/bu
below the CBOT nearby com futiures price (only 2% of the times the valuewas positive). The
feeder catde average basis for the period analyzed (1993-2006) was $2.71/cwt (only25% of the
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time this basis was negative). Lastly, live cattle basis average during 2001-2006 was |0.26/cwt
(20% of the time this basis was negative)^.
Table 2.2displays the implicadons of basis risk. Let's suppose that a catde feeder shortshedge
one October live catde futures contract at $84.47/cwt as soon as animals are placed on the
feedlot. This means that the producer commits to deliver40,000 lb of catde in October at
S84.47/cwt. Just before delivery-, the cattle feeder offsets the livecattle futures contract position
by buying back the contract. Under scenario2, the cattle feeder buys back the futures contract at
S85.98/cwt which means that he or she realized a lost of S1.51/cwt from this futures position
($84.74/cwt-$85.98/cwt). Then, the producer sells the catde in the cash market at $88.20, which
implies that the net sellingprice was $86.69, which fortunately is higher than the $84.74 that the
producer found acceptable sixmonths ago.This extra gain comes from the strengthening of the
basis. However, this does not always happen and catde feeders can lose unexpected money from
a weakening on the basis as shows in Table 2.2.
^Feeder cattle futures have been settled incash since 1986. The reasons behind this were the elimination of disputes
associated with grading, the reduction of basis risk which, according toElam and Davis (1990), was noticeably large
even for par grade and weight steers, reducing costs ofsettling the Aitures position, and eliminating the need to
transport the catde.
23
Table 2.2. Live cattle buying hedge
Date
Cash
Price
Future
Pricc
Basis^
Net Selling
Pricc
Change in Cash
and Futures Price
What Happened?
Today $83.19 $84.47 -$1.28 - Feeding process begun
6 months after - Scenario 1 $86.19 $87.92 -$1.73 $82.74 ^ Cash'^ ^ Fuhjres Basis weakened
6 months after - Scenario 2 588.20 $85.98 $2.22 $86.69 ^ Cash^^ Futures Basis strengthened
6 months after - Scenario 3 $82.29 $83.72 -$1.43 $83.04 ^ Futures Basis weakened
6 months after - Scenario 4 $85.12 $83.41 $1.71 $86.18 ^ Cash^^ Futures Basis strengthened
Negative sign means that futures are greater than cash prices.
Technical analysis
As dcscribcd by Greenfinch (1999), technical analysis assumes that markets have memory. If so,
past prices or the current price momentum can givean idea of the fiimre price evolution and
may be also possible to extract above-normal gains by using some trading techniques (Garcia et
al., 1988).Technical analysis is a tool that helps forecast fumre market activity and to detect
whether a trend would persist or whether it would change. This type of analysis uses statistical
and mathematical methods (e.g. confidence inten^als, percentages changes, and volatilit)') as well
as the use of visual presentations of the graphic signals (e.g. trends, patterns, and geometric
figures formation) to forecast pricemovements. This kind of analysis is commonly used along
with fundamental analysis, though, ver}' often traders rely on technical analysis to study short
term periods and depend on fundamental analysis to forecast long term processes.
Even though Fama's theoryof efficiency markets havebeen around for manyyears and have
received support from academics, some traders still doubt those type of markets exist. Perhaps,
as it was described by Ball (2003), the theory of efficient markets is, like all theories, an imperfect
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and limited way of viewing financial markets. The disagreement is impossible to solve
completely as longas there arc somany binding limitations to the asset pricing models that
underlie empirical tests ofmarket efficiency. Moreover, excessive volatility, regulations (i.e.
margin calls, stop loss limits, etc.), seasonal patterns, price overreactions, and asymmetr)' of
information assimilation canmake one question the existence of efficient markets. On top of
that, market participants do not always behave rationally especially when they are not completely
certain of the performanceof the trading strategies that they apply (i.e. hedging tools to reduce
price risk). Therefore, they don't necessarily make the decisions that couldhelp them reach the
expected profit (or at least the average profit) if using the futures market
Despite the limitations, traders veryoften follow certain rules that allow tliemmanage risk that
accompany trading. Blackman (2004), for example, defines a trader's "perfect master plan" as
one that has at least the following 10 essential concepts. A trader has to: a) be confident about
the trading signals of the strategy, b) be mentally prepared to trade, c) set a risk level for the
transactions that he or she is willing to tolerate, d) set realistic targets for a profit and
risk/reward ratios, e) study the fundamentals that may affect the market in wliich the trader is
going to operate professional traders useprobabilities and do not gamble), f) set alerts for entry
and exit signals and make sure all signals can be easily seen or detected with a clearvisual or
auditory signals (i.e. label major and minor support and resistance levels), h) set entry rules, g) set
exit rules, i) keep excellentrecords, and j) keep a trading journal for later reference.
Researches have often focused on evaluating the effect that applying technical tools has on
profitability. Franzmann (1976), Enen (1979), andGorman et al. (1985) found that proper use of
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technical tools can lead to a positive profit and to a better use of hedging strategies. They also
pointed out that carefully chosen strategies reducc tlie average loss and volatility of the returns in
the catde market. In addition, Parkand Irwin (2005) showed that the best tradingrules identified
generated positive annual mean net returns, though, technical trading rules were not profitable
after correcting for transaction costs, risk, anddata snooping biases during the period from 1985
to 2004.
Long and short moving averages
According to Barnes (1979), the basicassumption of the (arithmetic) moving-average approach
is ver}* similar to that of the trend line method for charting; the growth of the trend line is
considered to be linear. However, the simple moving average method based the trend's growth
line on the latest price, and not on the very first as trend lines do. This implies that the growth
line may change and is only related to the latest prices. The moving-average method gives equal
weight to each price used in determining the growth line, while the trend line technique gives
weight to the growth line determination for only those (two) price points that form the two tops
and bottoms in tlie price series.
Mathematically, tlie simplemoving average is equal to tlie mean of tlie pre\'ious nvaluesin a
sequence of data. Moving averages are used to smooth the data and to generatemore clarity in
the trends. According to Kenney andKeeping (1962), given a sequence , an ^-moving
average is a new sequence defined from the dj sequence by taking the average of the
subsequences of («is thenumber of theperiods for calculating themoving average) terms as
follows:
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The long average shows the trend and the short average helps to describe the changes in the
trend. As Barnes (1982) described, the underlying assumption is that the moving average lineof
current prices represents the current growth lineof tlie trend. If the actual pricc diverges
significandy from this growth trend, for example, if it goes below the line in a b\all trend or
above the line in a bear trend, the current trend itself is then believed, and a change in the actual
prices to a new, oppositely directed trend has probably occurred.
Quite often traders dealingwith moving averages use rsvo of them— long and short. The short
average is based on fewer days' raw data than the long average. If the short average crosses the
long average from above, then the market is considered to assume a downtrend. In contrast, an
increase in. the price of the commodity is expectedwhen the short average crosses the long
average from below (Figure 2.8). In other words, a crossing on the upside causes a buy signal,
and a crossing on the downside generates a sell signal (Brown (1999)).
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Figure 2.9. Moving averages on the live cattle futures markets
It is important to notice that buyingand selling signals are not always correct. As depicted in
Figure 2.8,when the buy signal appeared ^oint A) the price of the live catde futures contract
was higher than when the sell signal took place (point B) and money would have been lost if the
strategy was applied in the actual trading decision.
Momentums and oscillators —Mean and standard deviation
Kaufam (1978) defined the study of momentum and oscillators as die analysis of changes in
price rather than price levels. It establishes the pace of the commodity, the rate of ascent or
descent. A system that takes advantage of the momentum extremesmust be able to measure
them. The simplestway is to represent two horizontal lines above or below the "zero" line in
such away that the tops and bottoms of major moves areisolated. A statistical approach to this
measure involves the use of the average price of the asset past data as the "zero" line,
plus/minus a certain constant (often subjective) that multiplies the standard deviation from the
past of the assetprice to generate the trading band. In theory, prices of the commodity should
28
return back to themid price after going outside tlie band. Figure 2.9 depicts this type of strategy
for the daily live catde futures close prices and uses the average of the pre\'ious two years as the
"zero" line; the limits are defined as the average plus/minus one standard deviation during the
mentioned period.
Close pnoe
May-96 Feb-97 Nov-97 Aug-98 May-99 Feb-00 Nov-00
Figure 2.10. Corresponding momentum in the live cattle futures markets (1996-2000)
This strategy, although based on statistical analysis, is not simple and requires constant
inspection and financial muscle from the agent that uses it. The analyst must define the kind of
average that will be used as a "zero" line as well as the number of standard deviations to
calculate the upper and lower limits. In addition, traders that use this kind of strategy should
have enough monetary' resources to hold the position until the expected marketmovement
occurs. As Figure 2.9 illustrates, traders that took positions on live cattle futures contracts inJuly
of 1998 (point A) had to wait for fourmonths until the stocktouched the "zero" line (point B).
Without tlie proper financial strength someof them may have sold tlieirposition before the end
of the fourthmonth and, therefore, incurred a loss. In contrast, a traderwho had enough funds
to hold theposition during those four months would have earned 5.25% on that particular trade.
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Momentums and oscillators - Relative Strength Index (RSI)
The relative strength index is called an oscillator because it is an index (ranges from 0 to
that tends to bounce around between the valueof the lower and die upper limits. As described
byMurphy (1999) it uses the information on gains and losses during a certain period of rime to
definewhether a market is oversold or overbought. The RSI is calculated as follows:
orr ^00 , Average of n dajs'up closesRSI = 100 — , where KJ =
/ + RJ Average of n days' down doses
The number of days used in) for the calculation of tlie relative strength (RS) depends on die
sensitivity that the annalist wants to give to the index. The shorter the time period, the more
sensitive the oscillator becomes and the wider its amplitude is. Three important features of the
RSI are: a) it provides certain smoothing of the time series studied, b) it creates a constant
vertical range of 0 to 100, and c) if the average loss ever becomes zero, RSI becomes 100 by
definition. In Figure 2.10 the data for the live cattle fiitures market was used to calculate the RSI
while a 28-dayperiod was used to smooth out the RSI.
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Figure 2.11. RSI (n=28) for the live cattle futures markets (1996-2000)
The band in the previous figure was set using 70 and 30 as overbought and oversold levels,
respectively. Usually, if the RSI crosses the 30 line it is considered a warning for bullish tendency
for the asset. If the RSI crosses the 70 lineit is a warning for a bearishmarket In other words, in
an oversold market a crossing back above the 30 line it is taken by many traders as a
confirmation of an uptrend. In contrast, in an overbought market a crossing back under the 70
line can be used as a sell signal. In addition, the 50 level is also used by many traders as a market
indicator. When the RSI crosses above 50 it can be interpreted as a buy signal, and when the RSI
falls under 50 it can be considered as a sell signal.
One disadvantage of this strateg)' is that large increases and drops in a commodity pnce may
affect the RSI by creating false buy or sellindicators,as it is showed by in Figure 2.10 (theRSI
levelwronglysuggested buying the futures contract at point A at $68.83 and selling it latter at
point B at $67.53).
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CHAPTER 3. DATA CONSTRUCTION
Description of the cattle crush spread (CCS^
Tlic cattle crush spread is an intemiarkct spread inwhich, in theory, a transaction ismade for a
parUciilar crush value rather than making individual trades in each of the spread components. It
is defined as the difference between the sales value of live cattle and the combined cost of com
and feeder catde at a certain point in time. In the futures market, the minimum cattle crush that
can be negotiated involves going longin one com and one feeder cattle futures contract and
going short in two live catde futures contracts to try to more closely match quantities.'^
Producers benefit if spot prices of corn and feeder cattle at the maturity of the contract exceed
the delivery prices and respectively. Theyalso benefit if the spot price of Eve catde at
the maturity of the contract falls below the delivery price K,(position diagrams are depicted in
Figure 3.1).
Price ($/lb)
(a) Com
Long position
Price ($/lb)
(b) Feeder Cattle
Long position
Price ($/Ib)
(c) live Cattle
Short position
Figure 3.1. Payoffs of the futures contracts on the cattle crush spread
®Forclarit)' purposes selling (orgoing short) the crush will mean buying one corn and one feeder cattle futures
contracts and selling twolivecattle futures contracts. Conversely, buying (orgoinglong) the crushwill mean selling
one corn and one feeder cattle futures contracts and buying rwo live cattle futures contracts (this is also called
reversing the crush).
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In essence, producers try to sell the crush for as much as they can andattempt to buy it back
(unwind the position) for as litde as they can. In the case of a successfial exccudon of this
strateg)% a producerreceives extra benefits from trading the contracts before the cattle are fed.
This additional benefit is added to feeding returns once the catde are actually sold on the market.
When a catde feeder trades the crush, specific amounts of inputs and outputs are hedged.The
headcoverage for a 170-day feeding period that an Iowacatde feeder receives when trading the
crush are depicted in Figure 3.2.
One com future One feeder catde One fed catde futures
contract contains futures contract contract contams
280,000 lb contains 50,000 lb 40,000 lb
An animal consumes Animal weight at the Animals placed in
22.05 lb/day of corn beginning of feeding feedlots at 750 lb
for 170 days process is assumed to have an average daily
(feedingperiod) be 750 lb gain of 3.12lb/day
Thus, 3,528 lb per This means that one Thus, the selling
head are required feeder catde contract , weight for fed catde
during feeding is equivalent to is 1,280 lb
process 67 head
This means rhat one This means that one
corn contract fed fed catde contract is
approximately equivalent to
79 head 31 head
Figure 3.2. Number of head of cattle per selected futures contract
There is an issue that is important tomention here. Entering in the crush defined in figure 3.2
impHes that an Iowa producerwill have a coverage ratio of 79:67:62 head or 0.74:0.94:2
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contracts of corn, feeder catde, and live catde, respectively. However, producers can not buy
fractions of futures contracts and therefore, the minimal amount that they can use is 1:1:2 to
hedge 62 head. This generates coverage risk because com and feeder cattle are notperfecdy
hedged (i.e. over-hedged). In addition, the size of the futures contract can also be problematic
for producers. In an empirical study Gordam et al. (1982) called attention to the fact that the
pens of catde rarely matchup exacdy with a totalweight of 40,000 poundsof the futures
contract.As theypointed out, a pen containing 100 head of steers that arc expected to weigh on
average 1,050 pounds eachwhen sold is equivalent to 105,000 pounds of live catde.The nearest
total weight of a futures contract that couldbe obtained was three (40,000 pounds x 3 =
120,000 pounds). This means that producers finish up having 15,000 more pounds in futures
than they have in live catde.
Since catde have to reach a particularweight before they can be sold, the time they spend in the
feedlot and the feed provided has a direct effect on the number of contracts of com and feeder
cattle that are required to hedge the production. Indeed, animals that stayed in feedlots for
longer periods entered the feedlot lighter than those that remained there for shorter periods.
This also generates disparities on the catde crush proportion as described at the bottom ofTable
3.1.
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Table 3.1. Cattle crush proportion calculation for Iowa*
Corn Fuuircs Contract
Days on feed 110 170 250
Com needed (lb/day) 25.20 19.60 20.04
Total corn needed (lb) 2,772 3,332 5.010
Contract size (lb) 280,000 280,000 280,000
Head fed per contract 101 84 56
Feeder Catde Futures Contract
Contract size (lb) 50,000 50,000 50,000
Initial weight (lb) 797 750 567
Head per contract 63 67 88
Live Catde Futures Contract
Contract size (lb) 40,000 40,000 40,000
Average gain (lb/day) 3.63 3.12 3.02
Slaughter weight (lb) 1,196 1,280 1,322
Head per contract 33 31 30
Catde Crush Proportion
Com futures 0.66 0.74 1.08
Feeder catde 1.07 0.94 0.69
Live catde 2.00 2.00 2.00
* Data for the 110 antl 250 days scenarios were calculated from die TCSCF data.
Uses of the cattle crush spread
ITie cattle crush spread is a tool that can be employed in two differentways to avoidexposure to
the risk of variable prices (Figure 3.3):
• As a pre-placement hedging tool. Cattle feeders thathave anongoing operation cantrade
the spread duringa certain pedod before animals are placedin feedlots (circa 138 business
days). In doing this, producers hedge die risk of input price variation and get a profit (loss)
from trading the crush. Once animals enter the feedlot producers can: a) decide not tohedge
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the cattle thatare being fed in the feedyard (cash market strategy), or b) unwind the total of
the crush and go short in a new live cattle futures contract.
As a post-placement hedging tool. Cattle feeders can leave active the live cattle futures
contract that was shorted during the pre-placement period.They then receive profit (losses)
from shorting Uve catde contracts for a longer period and from trading the crush during the
pre-placcmcnt period.
' Profit from trading thecrush I I Profit from hedging live cattle \
Pce-placcment period Post-placement period
Profit from trading the crush
Prc-placement period Post-placement period
Trading strategj' Trading strategy Hedging Hedging
starts finishes strategy begins strategy- ends
(variable) (variable) (fixed) (fLxed)
Com and feeder cattle are
purchased in the spot market
Figure 3.3. Pre-placement and post-placement strategies
Cattle crush futures contract combinations
Now it is necessary to determine the months in which the future contracts will be traded if a
feeding period of six months (i.e. 170 days) is assumed. To deal with this subject various
arrangements of futures contracts can be used, though, tliis study focuses on the combinations
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tliat involve marketing fed cattle in April and October (Table 3.2)'. The April and October
strategy for yearling steers in Iowa kept the feedlot full by selling finished cattle and immediately
buying feeder catde. Thiswas themost profitable strategy on average for the period1994 to
2004 (Aguiar and Lawrencc (2005)).
Table 3.2. Contracts combinations for the cattle crush spread
Fumre Contracts Available on the Market
Corn Feeder Catde Fed Cattle*
Januar}'
March ; March 4\
! April 1
May May
July
[ August
September 1 September H
1 October
1
1
November
December
February
April
June
August
October
December
Contract for the even montlily cycle.
Subsequendy, the arrangement of March futures contracts of com and feeder catde with
October live futures contracts, and the September futures contracts of com and feeder cattle
withApril live futures contractswere the ones analyzed in this study (fromnow on these
combinarionvS will be called mar/mar/oct andsep/sep/apr).'" It is important to notice thata
feedlot operator that starts feeding steers in April is assumed to use the March corn contract
' In doing diis, catde producers are assumed to use theMarch and September live catde futures contracts.
rhe mar/apr/oct, sep/aug/apr, and sep/oct/apr contract combinations can also besuitable for the ITO-days
feeding period. However, dacse crushes are liighly correlated (e>0.8) to the mar/mar/oct and sep/sep/apr,
respectively.
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given the absence of the future contract for April. Table 3.3 depicts the delivery dates in 2006
for producers that trade the commodities hedgedby the crush.
Table 3.3. Dcliverv dates for selected futures contracts
Expected Delivery (or Ending
Month of the Contract
Corn
Mar 16, 2006
Sep 18, 2006
Feeder Cattle
Mar 30, 2006
Sep 28, 2006
Days on
Feed
170
170
Ready to Sell
Cattle on
Sep 16, 2006
Mar 17, 2007
Nearest Live
Catde Contract
Oct, 2006
Apr, 2007
Cattle crush spread calculation
The cattle crush spread is calcukted using the market prices of die futures contracts. The
following equation describes the way to assess the spread from the crush.
T r
[2x
100 lb)
X40,000/6-lx-
100
Fc. „ r $ ^
Klbj
500
X50,000/6-1 X
CO,,
100
• $
hu)
x5,000^>Mi
Where stands for "cattlecrush spread" at day t for the mlmlm-^6 futures contracts
combination and it is reported in S/cwt of feeder catde (or500 cwtthat areequivalent to 67
head). is the live catde futures contract price at day t for themonthm-^6^ is the corn
futures contract price at day / for the month and is the feeder futures contract price at
day t for die month th. As mentioned earlier, two live cattle contracts, one feeder catde futures
contract, andone corn futures contract were assumed to compute the cattle crush (1:1:2
coefficients in the equation).
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Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show plots of the evolution of the selected catde crush spreads from 1995 to
2006. These graphs do not represent a continuous dme scries because the catde crush was built
according to the Ufe of the contracts for each combinadon.
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Figure 3.4. Cattle crush spread for the mar/mar/oct combination (1995-2006)
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Figure 3.5, Cattle crush spread for the sep/sep/apr combination (1995-2006)
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After analyzing the evolution of the time series, a number of conclusions can be drawn: a) after a
grapliical analysis of the results no seasonal behavior was found in die data, b) there is not a
consistent correlation between the value of the crush and the price of the live cattle futures
contracts (Table B.l), c) high priccs for com in 1996 had an impact on the Level of the spreadin
1996 and 1997due to the fact that live cattle futures prices did not increase to compensate for
the higher cost of production inputs, d) the lack of liquidity on the futures market at the end of
the spread lifemight be the cause of the high volatility of the crush at the end of the majority' of
the years (especially 1999 and 2004), and e) negative cattie crush spreads can be possible as they
happened on five occasions in June of 2005 for the sep/sep/apr combination due to a rapid rise
in the price of feeder cattie while live cattle futures contract prices remained virtually the same
over the course of that month.
Cattle crush spread comparative statistics
As explained in Table 3.4, the way that contracts are combinedhas an effect on the level of the
cattle crush spread. Indeed, for the sep/sep/aprthe average spread was larger that tiie one
observed for the mar/mar/apr (|10.91/cwt vs. $8.6/cwt). Besides, both combinations depicted
similar volatility (near |1.5/cwt) and were negatively correlated (q=-0.09). It is important to
clarify that the spread that was calculated here is based on the ratio 1:1:2, which as it was shown
at the beginning of this chapter, means that producers incurred an extra production cost from
over-hedging corn and feeder cattle that is not reflected in the number of cattie sold. This
negatively affects the level of the spread.
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Table 3.4. Cattle crush spread summary of results ($/c\vt of feeder catde)
Futures Contacts
Combination
Mar/Mar/Oct
Sep/Sep/Apr
Trading Period Pre-placement Spread
Year InitiaJ Final Business Days Msix Min Average Std. Dev.
1995 31-Aug-94 22-Mar-95 141 11.16 6.16 8.97 1.09
1996 30-Aug-95 21-Mar-96 142 6.42 2.83 4.86 0.74
1997 26-Aug-96 19-Mar-97 143 12.45 7.80 10.76 1.20
1998 02-Sep-97 20-Mar-98 139 12.47 6.58 8.83 1.27
1999 03-Sep-98 22-Mar 99 137 14.70 7.58 10.44 1.87
2000 07-Sep-99 14-Mar-OO 132 11.03 6.73 8.50 1.10
2001 Ol-Sep-OO 14-Mar-Ol 133 12.31 6.72 8.84 1.51
2002 05-Sep-01 14-Mar-02 130 13.80 4.02 9.14 2.32
2003 03-Sep-02 14-Mar-03 133 12.35 5.28 8.49 2.15
2004 05-Sep-03 12-Mai-04 131 13.78 2.53 7.55 2.42
2005 Ol-Scp-04 14-Mar-05 133 12.48 7.05 9.90 1.11
2006 12-Sep-05 14-Mar-06 127 10.52 4.22 6.98 1.42
Mean 135 11.95 5.63 8.60 1.52
1995 22-Feb-94 21-Sep-94 148 16.30 10.04 13.31 1.56
1996 22-Feb-95 20-Scp-95 145 14.38 9.98 11.79 0.97
1997 23-Feb-96 19-Sep-96 146 11.37 4.65 8.21 1.76
1998 24-Feb-97 19-Scp-97 146 15.05 11.58 13.31 0.75
1999 02-Mar-98 21-Sep-98 142 17.09 9.35 12.64 2.03
2000 04-Mar-99 21-Sep-99 140 13.85 10.78 12.47 0.73
2001 Ol-iMar-OO 14-Sep-OO 138 14.86 10.24 12.98 1.01
2002 Ol-Mar-01 14-Sep-Ol 136 14.27 10.61 12.67 0.74
2003 13-Mar-02 13-Sep-02 129 15.10 8.92 12.14 1.35
2004 03-Mar-03 ll-Sep-03 135 13.60 4.33 10.71 2.12
2005 Ol-Mar-04 14-Sep-04 137 9.45 -1.25 4.23 2.50
2006 Ol-Mar-05 14-Sep-05 138 10.25 1.46 6.47 1.83
Mean 140 13.80 7.56 10.91 1.45
The distribution of the spread proved not to be normalwith an estimatedmean of |9.76/cwt
and standard deviation of $3.03/cwt (Kolmogorov-Smimov test statistic was 0.0645) which may
bea sign of animbalance that exists between buyers and sellers generating three different levels
of spreads (circles in Figure 3.6). In addition, the distribution of the first difference of prices was
more similar to the "bell-shaped" cur\'e; though, tlie truecumulative distribution function was
not a normally distributed one udth an estimated mean of -0.0041 and a standard deviation of
0.45 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic was 0.0368). It is important to notice that tiiere was still
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a number of observations located close to the tails which maybe a signof some abnormal
behavior that some traders would use as a tradingadvantage (Figure 3.7).
150 -
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%.
20%
0%
NO "O so so SO NO sO sO NO NO *0 O
r--CNT-<t<iii^r-CN--rou^r-c?; —
f'irni/ior~ei6cN'-rif^*tuSK
S/cwt N<imu} DiirrilrutKin
Figure 3.6. Distribution of the crush spreads (170-day feeding period)
250
200
|l50
s
£100 +
50
0
ooos5Tfcsjor>l^*ooo
lA CN
Oiangc in S/cwt
110%
90%
70%
50%
30%
10%
-10%
5-
•1:
£
i
Vr
ft
-4-2 0 2 4
NormJ Dumbur>Cfn
Figure 3.7. Distribution of the crush spreads daily variation (170-day feeding period)
An example of trading the crush
Suppose that in 2004 an Iowa feedlot operator put together a plan to start feeding steers at the
beginning ofApril of 2005 to then market tlie cattle inmid September of tlie same year. The
cattle crush spreads that suited this planwas the mar/mar/oct combination, which became
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available on September 1",2004 (i.e. 133 days before cattle were placed in the feedlot) at
$7.65/cwt. I.et's suppose that tlieproducer, based on previous behavior of the crush, decided
that it would be beneficial to sell the crush as soon as it exceeded $11/cwt. This happened on
November 19 '^' of 2004 when it reached $11.02/cwt. Similarly, the producer had the rule of
unwinding the position as soon die spread fell under 58/cu't. This took place on March 11'^ of
2005when it worth $7.99/cwt. The preceding operation means that the cattle feeder accepted
deliver)' of 280,000 lb of corn and 50,000 lb of feeder cattle in March and committed to deliver
80,000 lb of live catde in October at a spread of $11.02/cwt. However, he or she offset the
crush before the delivery date of the underlying commodities by buying it back at $7.99/cwt.As
it can be observed in Table 3.5, the producer obtained a significant profit from selling corn and
feeder catde futures contracts at a higher price than tliey were bought for, while there was a
money loss for trading the live cattle futures contracts due the fact that tlie two contracts were
bought back at a higher price than the purchase price. Despite of that loss, the producer ended
up making a net profit of 27.46% or $3.03/cwt from trading the crush.
Table 3.5. Example of payoffs from trading the mar/mar/oct cattle crush spread
Future
Contract
November 19, 2004 March 11,2005
CCS
ProfitAction
Contract
Price
CCS
Component
Action
Contract
Price
CCS
Component
Live Catde SeU 80.10 128.16 Buy 84.15 134.64 -6.48
Feeder Catde Buy 96.12 96.12 SeU 104.9 104.90 8.78
Corn Buy 210.25 21.03 SeU 217.5 21.75 0.73
ccs Sell - 11.02 Buy - 7.99 3.03
43
CHAPTER 4. DATAANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
Thischapter presents an evaluation of the strategies and rules based on the technical analysis
methods described in chapter 2. This chapter is divided in two parts: a) the first part contains an
evaluation of the trading strategies applied on the cattle crush before the catde areplaced in the
feedlot, b) the secondpart discusscs the strategies that are applied at any timeafter that and up
to the day the catde are marketed.The methods described here were applied to the catde crush
spread resulting from the contractcombinations mar/mar/oct and sep/sep/apr (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1. Summary of rules used to trade the spread during the pre-placement period
Naive It becomes available Last day of availability of the
(Figures A.4 and A.9) corn futures contract
Threshold* For mar/mar/oct when For mar/mar/oct when
(Figures A.5 and A.10) CCS>|11.15/cwt;for CCS<57.80/cwt; for
sep/sep/apr when sep/sep/apr when
CCS>$13.59/cwt CCS<$11.62/cwt
Moving Averages MA(5) penetrates MA(15) When MA(5) crosses MA(15)
(Figures A.6 and A.11) from the top from the bottom
Momentum Cattle crush overshoots the Cattle crush crosses the
(Figures A.7 and A.12) upper limit defined by "zero" line
— 2
X1995 + ^199^
RSI Cattle crush spread level Catde crush spread levelwas
(Figures A.8 and A.13) exceeds die 70 value for under the 50 value for two
two consecutives days consecutives days
*Recall tliat the values of the CCS aieexpressed in$/cwtof feeder cattle.
Toassess the trading profits, itwas assumed a commission and fee cost ofnegotiation ofone
futures contract of$36 round-turn (this is equivalent toS0.29/cwt per crush negotiated). In
addition, nomargin accounts were assumed in this evaluation, and therefore, diere were no
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margin calls and no interest earned. Lastly, the initial days of trading varied with the tvpe of
strateg)' used (see tables B.2. and B.3).
Prc-placcment strategies
The following are thedescriptions of the trading strategies applied on the catde crush spread.
Numerical outcomes of these strategies canbe found inTables 4.2 and 4.3while Figures A.4 to
A.12 in the appendix are the corresponding graphical representations.
• NaiVe strategy. The cattle crush spread was shorted the first available trading day and
bought back the last negotiation day. Recall that the cattle crush spreadbecomes available
when the live cattle futures contract docs, while the last trading day of the crush matches the
last trading day of the com funires contract (which ends around two weeks before the feeder
cattle futures contract). Under this fixed strateg)', only a crush downtrend (measured from
beginning point to end point) is profitable (before trading costs). This positive behavior
happened only three times for die mar/mar/oct combinations, but it happened nine times
for the sep/sep/apr arrangement.
• Threshold strategy. Two threshold levels were calculated as the best possible entry andexit
values in each of the crushes analyzed. A simulation was conducted to find thevalues of the
limits that maximized the average profitof the years analyzed subject to the fact that the rule
has to be applicable on allof the 12years studied. The limits used for the mar/mar/oct
were: a) the crush was sold when the crush value exceeded SI 1.15/cwt and bought back as
soon as the crush was underS7.80/cwt, or b) the crush was bought as soon as the crush
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value dropped under $7.80/cwt and was sold when crush value exceeded $11.15/cwt'\ The
limits used for the sep/sep/apr were: a) the crush was sold when itsvalue exceeded
$13.59/cwt and boughtbackas soon as itsvalue was under $11.62/cwt, or b) the crush was
bought as soon as the crushvalue fell under$11.62/cwt andwas soldwhen crush value
exceeded S13.59/cwt. Lastly, if it happened tliatonly one of the levels was penetrated and
the positionwas left open, it was offset on the last tradingdayof the cattie crush.
Tlie addition of entry and exit limits as well as the possibilit)' for producers to go short or
long on the crush made this strategy flexible and improved the returns that were obtained.
Indeed, 11 out of the 12 years analyzed showed positive returns (before and after
commissions) for the mar/mar/oct combination while nine of the returns (before and after
commissions) for the sep/sep/aprwere positive.
Moving averages strategy. Short-term (5 days) and a long-term (15days) moving averages
were calculated to create a trading rule. Under this, the crush was sold when the MA(5)
crossed the M/\(15) from the top and bought backwhen the MA(5) penetrated the MA(15)
from the bottom. This strategy was applied asmany times as the signals weregenerated.
Again, if it happened that the last negotiation signal left the position open, the crush was
soldor bought (depending on the lastaction taken) on the last trading dayof the cattle
crush.
" Ifa liigher value for the upper limit were used (say $11.16/cwt) the rule would nothave been applicable for 1996.
Oncontrast, if a lower number for the upper limit were used (say 57.79/cwt) average profit would nothave been
the maximum.
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The performance of the moving average was somewhat disappointing because trading costs
and the sharp movement of the crush's level both hurt the returns. For tlie mar/mar/oct
combination, sevenyears showed positive returns (before commissions) and only three years
proved to be positive returns (before commissions) for tlie sep/sep/apr. When the trade
cost was added, those numbers dropped to two and zero respecdvely.
Momentum strategy. The "zero" line and the standarddeviation were calculated using the
1995's cattle crush spread data. For both futures contract combinations the upper and the
lower limits were calculated addingand subtracting 2/3 of 1995's cattle crush spread
standard deviation. Catde feeders were assumed to short the crush as soon as it was available
on the market. This initial short position was offset when either of the following two
happened: a) the crush value crossed the "zero" Une, or b) the current value of die spread
was larger than the initial valueof the spreadplus/minus 1/2 of the year1995 standard
deviation (gain level and stop loss level). Once the initial short positionwas unwound, the
crush was: a) bought if its value crossed die lower limit, or b) sold if its value crossed the
upper limit. Both positions were offset as soon as the spread crossed the "zero" line or the
stop loss level was reached.
To prevent the crush spread from being outside the trading area, the "zero" line was
recalculated ever)' time the crush spread remained outside the band for 30 consecutive
trading days. When diis happened anew "zero" line was computed using the average for the
previous five business days of the crush negotiation (the standard deviation remained the
Tins initial short position was created with the objective offaking advantage ofpossible reductions of the price of
the crush in the first days of its trading life.
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same). If it happened tliat the last trading signal left the position open the crush was sold or
bought (depending on the last position assumed) on the last day of the crush negotiations.
This was amore elaborate strategy that mixed dynamics with static rules and required trading
skills. The performance of the strategy was fine, although thevolatilit)' of returns increased.
Both combinations of futures contracts showed 10 years of positive returns.
• RSI strategy. The crushwas: a) soldif the RSI stayed above the 70 level (overbought Une)
for at least two consecutives days and bought backif the RSI stayed under the 50 level for at
least two consecutives days, or b) bought if the RSI stayed under the 30 level (oversold line)
for at least two consecutives and was sold backwhen the RSI stayed above the 50 levelline
for at least two days. The mar/mar/oct combination showed eight years of positive returns
while there were seven for the sep/sep/apr arrangement.
Additional results of trading the mar/mar/oct combination
As it is shown in Table 4.2 diree of the strategies evaluated showed positive benefits (threshold,
momentum and RSI), however, when trading costs were taking in account only the threshold
strategy and the momentum strategyremainedpositive. The threshold strategj'was the one with
better performance at a lower cost although its lack of flexibility reducedits hedging power.
Indeed, the pre-placement hedging from this strategy covered in average only90 of the 145
business days that the crushwas available before cattle entered the feedlot, lettingdie producer
exposed to price variability of inputs for 55 days before animals were placed.
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Interestingly, tlie moving average strategy was themost expensive one to implement and it had
theworstperformance even though it was an easy-to-follow dynamic strategy. The largest net
losses fromapplying thismethodhappened in 2006 ($8.28/cwt of feeder cattle was the loss).
The moving average strateg)'^ did not perform well when the market tendenc)' was flat although
volatile. In contrast, the highest net return was reached in 2006 using the momentum strategy
(net profitreached $5.15/cwt of feeder catde)^\
Table 4.2. Returns from trading the mar/mar/oct crushcombination ($/cwt of feeder catde)
Naive Tlircshold Moving Averages Momentum RSI
Year Trade
Cost
Profit
Net
Profit
Trade
Cost
Profit
Net
Profit
Trade
Cost
Profit
Net
Profit
Trade
Cost
Profit
Net
Profit
Trade
Cost
Profit
Net
Profit
1995 0.29 0.09 0.40 0.29 3.50 3.21 2,30 1.07 -1.23 1,44 2.86 1.42 0.86 0.68 -0.18
1996 0.29 -0.67 -0.96 0.29 -0.67 -0,96 4.03 -4,07 -8.10 1.44 4.40 2.96 1.15 0.19 -0.97
1997 0.29 -0.87 -1.16 0.29 3.37 3.09 2,88 1,26 -1.62 1.44 -0.29 -1.73 1.15 -0.56 -1.71
1998 0.29 -1.44 -1.73 0.29 3.94 3,65 2.88 1.05 -1.83 3.46 6.08 2.63 0.58 1.04 0.47
1999 0.29 0.07 -0.22 0.29 3.85 3,56 2.30 2,33 0.02 2,02 0,56 -1.46 0.86 -1.52 -2.38
2000 0.29 -0.94 -1.23 0.29 1.95 1.66 2.88 -0.94 -3.82 1.87 1.78 -0.09 0.86 1.16 0.30
2001 0.29 -2.91 -3.20 0.29 3.81 3.52 1.73 1,80 0.07 2,02 -1.50 -3..52 0.86 -0.68 -1.54
2002 0.29 -4.86 -5.15 0.29 4.39 4.10 2.88 1.43 -1.45 2.30 2.54 0.24 0.86 0.31 -0.56
2003 0.29 ^.07 -4.36 0.29 3.88 3.59 2.88 2.48 -0.40 1.30 3.86 2.57 0.29 -3.73 -4.01
2004 0.29 4.08 3.79 0.29 4.10 3.81 2.88 -5.40 -8.28 2.30 2.74 0.43 0.86 1.43 0.57
2005 0.29 -0.06 -0.35 0.29 4.03 3.74 2.88 -4.39 -7.27 2.88 6.03 3.15 0.29 0.94 0.65
2006 0.29 -2.94 -3,22 0.29 2.94 2.65 2.88 -4.83 -7.71 2.16 7.31 5.15 0.86 2.43 1.57
Mean 0.29 -1.16 -1.45 0.29 3.26 2.97 2.78 -0.68 -3.47 2.05 3-03 0.98 0.79 0.14 -0.65
Std Dev. 0.00 2.38 2.38 0.00 1.39 1.39 0.54 3.08 3.39 0.64 2.68 2.47 0.28 1.61 1.56
Years(+)
- 3 2 - 11 11 - 7 2 - 10 8 - 8 5
Max 0.29 4.08 3.79 0.29 4.39 4.10 4.03 2,48 0.07 3.46 7.31 5.15 1.15 2.43 1.57
Min 0.29 -4.86 -5.15 0.29 -0.67 -0.96 1.73 -5,40 -8.28 1.30 -1.50 -3.52 0,29 -3.73 -4.01
Additional results of trading the sep/sep/apr combination
The sep/sep/apr combination of the crush brought more profit when traded than the
mar/mar/oct combination and four out of the five strategies showed positive net returns (Table
4.3). The momentum strategy was die most profitable (net average gain of $2.41/cwt) although
Aprofit of $5.15/cwt of feeder cattle isequivalent toa profit of $41.53/head sold (= S5.15/cwt x 500/62 head
sold) or $3.24/cwt (=$41.53/head x 100/1,280 lb).
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net returns from the naive and threshold strategy were fairly large (around $0.86/cwt on
average). However, it is worth mentioning that the positive return from the naive strategy was
associated witha highest variation of the returns from trading which may beseenas awarning
signal by feedlot operators that decide to use this tactic. The moving average strategy showed the
worstperformance withan average net loss of $5.27/cwt of feeder cattle during the period
analyzed (1998 was the worst year for tliis strategy when a net loss of $12.86/cwt was realized).
Table 4.3. Returns from trading the sep/sep/apr crush combination ($/cwt of feeder catde)
Naive Tlireshold iMc)vinj» Averages Momentum RSI
Year Trade
Profit
Net Trade
Profit
Net Trade
Profit
Net Trade
Profit
Net Trade
Profit
Net
Cost Profit Cost Profit Cost Profit Cost Profit Cost Profit
1995 0.29 -6.26 -6.55 0,29 3.70 3,41 3,46 1.73 -1.73 1,15 0.89 -0.26 0.58 -0,66 -1.24
1996 0.29 2.70 2.41 0,29 2.31 2.02 3.46 -3.40 -6,85 1.15 3.44 2.29 0.58 0,63 0.05
1997 0.29 3.09 2.80 0,29 -3.09 -3,38 3,46 2.48 -0,98 1.73 7.58 5,86 1.15 8.04 6.89
1998 0.29 1.40 1.12 0,29 3.32 3,03 3,46 -9.40 -12.86 1.73 7.88 6.15 0.29 0.49 0.20
1999 0.29 -7.11 -7.39 0.29 3.63 3,34 2.30 0.33 -1.98 1.15 -0,56 -1.71 0.58 -0,23 -0.80
2000 0.29 1.24 0.96 0.29 2.49 2.20 2.88 -3,07 -5.95 0.58 -2.20 -2.77 0.58 1.09 0.52
2001 0.29 -3.00 -3,29 0.29 3.53 3,24 3.46 -0.71 -4.17 1.15 3.22 2.07 0.58 0.86 0.29
2002 0.29 0.77 0.48 0.29 2.06 1.77 3.46 -2.10 -5.56 1.15 1.53 0.38 0.29 0.44 0.15
2003 0.29 3.24 2,95 0.29 2,43 2.14 3.46 -4.10 -7.55 1.73 4,76 3,03 0.58 -0,11 -0.69
2004 0.29 8.77 8,48 0.29 2,35 2.06 2.30 -0.73 -3.03 1.73 6.63 4.90 0.58 -4.36 -4.93
2005 0.29 4.36 4.07 0.29 -4.36 -4.65 3.46 -5.23 -8.69 2.02 9.82 7.81 1.15 4.83 3.68
2006 0.29 5.06 4.77 0.29 -5,06 -5.34 2.88 -0.99 -3.87 1.44 2.64 1.20 0.58 -3.06 -3.63
Mean 0.29 1.19 0.90 0.29 1.11 0.82 3.17 -2.10 -5,27 1.39 3,80 2.41 0,62 0.66 0.04
Std Dev. 0.00 4.62 4.62 0.00 3.26 3.26 0.46 3.25 3.41 0.40 3,65 3.28 0.27 3.22 3.04
YcarsC+)
- 9 9 - 9 9 - 3 0 - 10 9 - 7 7
Max 0.29 8.77 8.48 0.29 3.70 3.41 3.46 2,48 -0,98 2.02 9.82 7.81 1.15 8.04 6.89
Min 0.29 -7.11 -7.39 0,29 -5,06 -5.34 2,30 -9,40 -12,86 0.58 -2,20 -2,77 0.29 -4.36 -4,93
Post-placement hedging- strategies
The impact of trading tlie crush in the pre-placement period was studied anddiscussed in the
previous section. In diis new section the effects on the returns of hedging and not hedging the
cattle put on feed were calculated. In doing so, three different post-placement scenarios were
evaluated: a) the cattle feeder carried on without hedging and dierefore profit was subject to the
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beha\aor of tlic cash market (CCS + No hedge)'"', b) the cattle producer shorted the catde once
they entered the feedlot, thus, the producer received anextra profit (loss) from this hedging
strategy (CCS + Hedge LC), andc) the feedlot operator only offset the com and feeder cattle
futures of the catde crush that was established prior to the animals' placement in the feedlot and
then the producer received an extra profit (loss) from this hedging strateg)' (CCS + Keep LC).
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 summarize these findings.
Results for the mar/mat/oct combinatioii
To evaluate this scenario the assumptionwas made that cattle were hedged as soon as they
entered the feedlot (which happened on the first tradingday of April of each year) and were
then sold 170 days after the placement (i.e. onSeptember 18'*" of each year). Ingeneral, theuse
of the trading strategies on the cattle crush spread and then carrying the catde without hedging,
did not assure a reduction in the net return volatility. However, the catde crush spread together
with some of the two types of post-placement hedging systematically reducedpricevolatility
across these trading strategies.
Whenpost-placement hedging strategies were used, profit only increased 20%of the time. In
the years where net returns from yearling steers were negative (1998,2000, 2001 and2004),
trading tlie crush along with any of the two post-placement tactics helped producers to cut
losses by nearly $0.66/cwt on average peryear. In contrast, when pre-placement and post-
Cash price used to calculate the profit were for the Central Iowa com, St. loseph-Missouri feeder cattle and lowa-
Mirmesota fed cattle.
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placement strategies were used inyears of positive profits, producers forgo $3.91 /cwtof the
profit'^ .
Table 4.4 also contains a column called non-crush cost wliich incorporates the cost of
supplement, salt& minerals, 50% of com silage, operating and overhead, transportation and
labor. When the value of the pre-placement and post-placement strateg)^ was larger than the
value of the non-crush cost, a net gain from applying the strategy was realized. 2001 and 2002
were the worstyears with net losses that ranged from $12.55/cwt to $3.70/cwt. On the contrary,
2003 was the most profitable year with net gains that ranged from $44.77/cwt to $66.11/cwt.
i5 $3.91/cwt of feeder catde are equivalent to $31.53/hcad sold (= $3.91/c\vt x 500/62 head sold) orS2.46/cwr
(=$31.53/hcad x 100/1,280 lb).
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Results for the sep/sep/apr combination
For this scenario it was assumed that catde entered the feedlot die first trading day of October
ofeach year and was marketed 170 days after the placement (i.e. March 20'*^ ofeach year). In
general, using the cattle crush trading strateg)' along with some of the two types of hedging
proved to be superior strategies that increased gains from feeding cattle. Additionally, trading the
spread along witli hedging live cattle onceanimals entered the feedlot had a beneficial effect on
the variability of returns among trading strategies. In contrast, keeping the live cattle contract on
the crush that was traded in the pre-placement period considerably increased the volatility of
returns under the threshold and moving averages strategies. In most cases, keeping the live cattle
futures contract was more profitable than shorting a new livecattle contract or carrying the
catde without hedging.
In years were net returns from yearling steerswere negative (1998, 2005 and 2006) trading the
crush alongwith anyof the two post-placement strategy helped producers to cut losses in nearly
$2.47/cwt in average peryear. On the contrar)-, when returns were positive producers forgo
$0.49/cwtof the profitwhen the pre-placement andpost-placement strategies were used. When
the non-crush costswere included, 2003 finished upbeing die most profitabilit}' year because
net returns from the selected strategies weremuch larger than the non-crush cost of $13.69/cwt.
In contrast, in 2005 and 2006 net returns from the tactics analyzed were lower than the non-
crush cost of $15.01/cwt and $16.00/cwt respectively. This means that producers incurred in a
net loss in those years.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS
Summary
The cattle crush spread is an easy-to-understand variable that can help cattle feeders to better
hedge. Because producers own the catde and need to buycorn and feeder catde, trading the
catde crush spread gives theman opportunity to compress three market futures contract prices
into one. Analyzing its behavior and evaluadng its trajectory help producers makebetter hedging
decisions and makean extraprofit. In addidon, using the catde crush spreadhelps to gauge die
relative cost of production and helps themmakebetter investment decisions. The issue with the
crush is that Iowa producers have to be aware that they can not buy fractions of futures
contracts to cover their 0.74:0.94:2 ratio and therefore, the minimal amount that they can use is
1:1:2 to hedge 62 head. This generates coverage riskbecause corn and feeder catde are not
perfecdy hedged.
The catde crush spread can be constructed assuming different length of feeding periods. This
will affect the futures contract combinations and, subsequendy, the levelof returns. In this
research, it was showed that the catde crushcombination sep/sep/apr wasmore profitable than
themar/mar/apr combination. However, the variation in the profit level isnot considerably
large when themar/apr/oct, sep/aug/apr, andsep/oct/apr contract combinations were used to
suit the 170-days feeding period analyzed in this thesis. These contractswere highly correlated
with themar/mar/oct andsep/sep/apr respectively. Therefore, cattle feeders may expect to
find values closer to the ones found in this research if theydecide to use the feeder cattle futures
contracts of the months of April, August, and October.
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After analyzing the evolution of the cattle crush spread time scries, a number of conclusions can
be drawn: a) no seasonal behavior was found in the data, b) there is a not consistent correlation
between the value of the crush and die price of the live catdc futures contracts, c) high prices for
com in 1996 had an impact on the level of die spread in 1996 and 1997 due to the fact that live
catde futures prices did not increase to compensate for the higher cost of production inputs, d)
the lack of liquidit}' on the futures market at the end of the spread lifemight be the cause of the
high volatility of the crushat the end of themajorit)' of the years (especially 1999 and 2004), and
e) negative catde crush spreads can be possible as theyhappenedon five occasions inJune of
2005 for the sep/scp/apr combination due to a rapid rise in the price of feeder cattle while live
catde futures contract prices remained virtually the same over the course of that month.
Additionally, thedistribution of the catde spread values proved not to be normal, which may be
a sign of an imbalance that exists between buyers and sellers, generating threedifferent levels of
spreads. Thedistribution of the first difference ofprices was more similar to the "beU-shaped"
curve; though, the true cumulative distribution function was not a normally distributed one. The
values located close to the tails of the last distribution may bea sign ofsome abnormal behavior
that some traders would use as a trading advantage.
Obtaining benefits from negotiating the catde crush spread requires a consistent set oftrading
rules that let producers take advantage ofthe variations in die crush spread. Acarefiilly applied
trading plan proved to be bcneficial for catde feeders in terms ofextra returns from die trading
and also from the reduction in price variation that comes from hedging. For the mar/mar/apr
combination, three of the trading strategies evaluated depicted positive benefits (threshold.
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momentum andRSI), however, when trading costs were taking in account only the threshold
strategy and the momentum strategy remained positive. For the sep/sep/apr combination, four
out of the five strategics showed positive net returns. Momentum strategy was themost
profitable, although, net returns from the naive and threshold strategy were fairly large. The
moving average technical strategj' was the onewith tliepoorest performance in both futures
contract combinations. This strategy did not do well when sharp variations on the crushvalue
were present. In addition, trading costs were tlie highest among all strategies analyzed. In
consequence, applying trading strategies may be problematic for some catde producers. On the
one hand, it is a time consuming process that requires producers to keep neat records and
calculations in order to be able to apply the trading strategies. On the other hand, transactions
costs reduced most of the profits that was obtained from the trading strategies.
In general, trading the cattle crush spread dudng the pre-placement period and then hedging the
catde that are placedin feedlots proved to be a strategy that reduces profit volatility, even
though it reduces the profit obtained byproducers. This is consistentwith tlie theoryofhedging
because producers, to be able to reduce exposure to the riskof variable prices, have to forgo
part of the profit. When pre-placement and post-placement strategies were applied on the
mar/mar/oct crush combination, 2003 finished up being the best year while 2001 and 2002 were
the worst. For the sep/sep/oct, 2003 also showed the betterbehavior across strategies because
the net returns from the strategies weremuch larger than the non-crush cost. In contrast, in
2005 and 2006 net returns from the tactics analyzed were lower than the non-crush cost. This
means that producers incurred in a loss in those years.
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Recommendations
Future research on the use of the cattle crush spreadas a pre-placement and post-placement
hedging strategy' should extend the number of years analyzed in order to refine the trading rules
and incorporate information when rare events on the underlying components of the catde crush
occur. Finally, new research on the cattle crush strateg}' should evaluate those combinations of
fumres contracts that suppose larger (or shorter) feeding period and different marketing months
from April and October.
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL FIGURES
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Figure A.I. Central Iowa com, weekly price volatility (2001-2006)
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Figure A«2. St.Joseph (Missouri) feedercattle, weekly price volatility (2001-2006)
Nfav-02 Mar-05 Mar-06
FigureA.3. Iowa-Minnesota fed steers,weekly pricevolatility (2001-2006)
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FigureA.4. Naive strategyplots,mar/mar/oct cattle crush spread (1995-2006)
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Figure A.5. Threshold strategy plots, mar/mar/oct cattlecrushspread (1995-2006)
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Figure A.6. Moving average strategy plots, mar/mar/oct cattle crush spread (1995-2006) 
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Figure A.7. Momentum strategy plots, mar/mar/oct cattle crush spread (1995-2006)
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Figure A.8. RSI strategy plots, mar/ mar/ oct cattle crush spread (1995-2006) 
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Figure A.9. Narve strategy plots, sep/sep/apr cattle crush spread (1995-2006)
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Figure A.10. Threshold strategy plots, sep/ sep/ ape cattle crush spread (1995-2006) 
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Figure A.11. Moving average strategy plots, sep/sep/apr cattle crush spread (1995-2006) 
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Figure A.12. Momentum strategy plots, sep/sep/apr cattle crush spread (1995-2006)
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Figure A.13. RSI strategy plots, sep/sep/apr cattle crush spread (1995-2006) 
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APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table B.l. Correlation coefficient between CCS value and live cattle futures contracts
Year mar/mar/oct sep/sep/apr
1995 0.38 -0.90
1996 0.09 0.68
1997 -0.33 -0.66
1998 -0.18 -0.15
1999 0.21 -0.94
2000 0.81 0.09
2001 0.20 >0.64
2002 0.35 0.51
2003 0.11 -0.45
2004 0.05 -0.63
2005 -0.54 -0.65
2006 0.08 0.05
Table B.2. Starting dates of the selected trading strategies (mar/mar/oct)
Year Naive Threshold Moving Averages Momentum RSI
1995 31-Aug-94 30-Sep-94 4-Oct-94 31-Aug-94 20-Oct-94
1996 30-Aug-9S 30-Aug-95 21-Mar-96 30-Aug-95 27-Sep-95
1997 26-Aug-96 3-Sep-96 19-Mar-97 26-Aug-96 19-Sep-96
1998 2-Sep-97 2-Sep-97 20-Mar-98 2-Sep-97 23-Dec-97
1999 3-Sep-98 13-Oct-98 ll-Mar-99 3-Sep-98 21-Oct-98
2000 7-Sep-99 8-Sep-99 2-Mar-OO 7-Sep-99 U-Oct-99
2001 1-Sep-OO 29-Sep-OO 20-Fcb-01 1-Sep-OO 26-Sep-OO
2002 5-Sep-Ol 11-Oct-Ol 14-Mar-02 5-Sep-Ol 22-Oct-Ol
2003 3-Sep-02 3-Sep-02 14-Mar-03 3-Sep-02 3-Dec-02
2004 5-Sep-03 5-Sep-03 13-Feb-04 5-Sep-03 17-NOV-03
2005 l-Sep-04 l-Sep-04 14-Mar-05 l-Scp-04 l^Feb-05
2006 12-Sep-05 12~Sep-05 15-Feb-06 12-Sep-05 15-Dec-05
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TableB.3. Starting dates of the selected trading strategies (sep/sep/apr)
Year NaiVc Threshold Moving Av'erages Momentum RSI
1995 22-Fcb-94 22-Fcb-94 28-Mar-94 22-Feb-94 25-Apr-94
1996 22-Feb-95 22-Feb-95 12-Apr-95 22-Feb-95 31-Jul-95
1997 23-Feb-96 23-Feb-96 21-Mar-96 23-Feb-96 lO-May-96
1998 24-Feb-97 24-Feb-97 18-Mar-97 24-Feb-97 28-Jul-97
1999 2-Mar-98 2-Mar-98 3-Apr-98 2-Mar-98 27-May-98
2000 4-Mar-99 15-Mar-99 25^Mar-99 4-Mar-99 17-Jun-99
2001 1-Mar-OO 1-Mar-OO 30-Mar-00 1-Mar-OO 22-Mar-OO
2002 1-Mar-Ol 9-May-Ol 26-Mar-Ol 1-Mar-Ol 18-Jun-Ol
2003 13-Mar-02 5-Apr-02 3-Apr-02 13-Mar-02 26-Jun-02
2004 3-Mar-03 3~Mai:-03 15-Apr-03 3-Mar-03 29-Jul-03
2005 l-Mar-04 l-Mar-04 26-Apr-04 l-Mar-04 31-Mar-04
2006 l-Mar-05 l-Mar-05 23-Mar-05 l-Mar-05 24-May-05
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